The cash on Satyam’s books was not in the bank, and the revenue that sold investors an IT growth story was not the revenue the business had earned. On 7 January 2009 then-chairman B. Ramalinga Raju emailed the Securities and Exchange Board of India a confession. The 30 September 2008 balance sheet, he wrote, carried inflated, nonexistent cash and bank balances of 50.40 billion rupees (about $1.04 billion) against 53.61 billion in the books; accrued interest of 3.76 billion rupees that did not exist; an understated liability of 12.30 billion rupees on funds he had arranged; and an overstated debtors position. For that September quarter the company reported revenue of 27.00 billion rupees and an operating margin of 6.49 billion against, he said, actual revenue of 21.12 billion and an actual margin of 610 million. The gap had started as a marginal difference between real operating profit and the figure in the accounts and had grown for years. The promoters held a small stake. Poor results, he wrote, risked a takeover that would expose the hole. “It was like riding a tiger, not knowing how to get off without being eaten.” The aborted Maytas acquisition was, in his account, a last attempt to replace fictitious assets with real ones. That letter is the confession. The how, as the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission later alleged in a civil complaint, was false invoices and forged bank statements. The why was to keep a growth story the real margins could not carry.
What the Confession and SEBI Record
SEBI’s order of 15 July 2014 (WTM/RKA/SRO/64–68/2014) opens on that email and then compares books with bank material. The order describes sales inflation running to thousands of crores between about 2003–04 and September 2008, fixed deposits that did not exist, and accrued interest booked on those deposits. The operative part restrains Raju, then-managing director B. Rama Raju, former CFO Vadlamani Srinivas, former finance vice president G. Ramakrishna, and former internal-audit head V. S. Prabhakara Gupta from the securities market for 14 years, and directs them to disgorge wrongful gains with simple interest at 12 percent a year from 7 January 2009. Those are Indian regulator findings and directions. They are not a United States criminal judgment.
SEBI — order, Satyam Computer Services Ltd. (15 July 2014): https://www.sebi.gov.in/sebi_data/attachdocs/1405419346107.pdf
The U.S. Case Was Civil
Satyam’s American depositary shares traded on the New York Stock Exchange, so the fiction was also a U.S. disclosure case. On 5 April 2011 the SEC charged the company, by then doing business as Mahindra Satyam, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia (Civil Action No. 1:11-cv-00672). The Commission alleged that former senior managers built more than 6,000 false invoices into the general ledger and created bogus bank statements to mimic payment, producing more than $1 billion in fictitious cash — about half of reported assets — over five years. After the fraud became public, the Commission noted, Indian authorities dissolved the board, installed government-nominated directors, and filed criminal charges. The company under new leadership settled without admitting or denying the allegations: a $10 million civil penalty, a permanent injunction against future reporting violations, training, and an independent consultant. The SEC said Raju and other former executives, and two lead audit partners, were defendants in a criminal trial then underway in India. That is the Commission describing an Indian prosecution. It is not a U.S. criminal conviction, and this page does not invent one.
SEC — Satyam charged with financial fraud (Release 2011-81, 5 April 2011): https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-81.htm
SEC — complaint, SEC v. Satyam Computer Services Ltd. d/b/a Mahindra Satyam: https://www.sec.gov/files/litigation/complaints/2011/comp21915.pdf
The Audit Firms
The same day the SEC sanctioned five India-based PricewaterhouseCoopers affiliates that had been Satyam’s independent auditors, for deficient audits from 2005 through January 2009. The penalty was $6 million, which the Commission described as the largest it had imposed on a foreign-based accounting firm in an enforcement action. The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board’s settled order — consented to without admitting or denying the findings — added a $1.5 million civil penalty against Price Waterhouse, Bangalore and Lovelock & Lewes, a censure of the five firms, an independent monitor, and limits on new U.S. issuer audit work. The Board found that those two firms let Satyam management send cash-confirmation requests to the banks and return the supposed replies, contrary to the firms’ own audit plan and to the PCAOB confirmation standard, and that the failure contributed to missing a cash balance overstated by about $1 billion. The firms’ joint quality-control system had not caught a wider confirmation practice that fell short of Board standards. U.S. sanctions on the auditors are civil and disciplinary.
SEC — India-based PwC affiliates charged (Release 2011-82): https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-82.htm
PCAOB — settled disciplinary order against PW India (5 April 2011): https://pcaobus.org/Enforcement/Decisions/Documents/PW_India.pdf
The Hyderabad Verdict
On 9 April 2015 a special sessions court in Hyderabad convicted all ten accused, including Raju. Contemporaneous court reporting listed criminal conspiracy read with cheating for all ten; criminal breach of trust for the Raju brothers; and forgery, use of forged documents, and fudging of accounts for Raju, finance managers, and external auditors S. Gopalakrishnan and Talluri Srinivas, with impersonation counts for the auditors and a finance vice president. Those are Indian court results as reported from the verdict. They do not become a Washington guilty plea by being printed next to the SEC press release.
The Hindu — special sessions court conviction counts (Hyderabad, 9 April 2015): https://www.thehindu.com/news/cities/Hyderabad/satyam-case-all-10-convicted-for-criminal-conspiracy-cheating/article7084850.ece
Roles, Not Color
Raju appears here as chairman, author of the 7 January 2009 email, SEBI noticee, and accused in the Hyderabad case. The audit partners appear as engagement partners in the PCAOB order and as accused in the Indian verdict. No lifestyle gloss. The successor name in SEBI’s order does not erase the 2009 books.
What the Paper Trail Settles
Documented: a chairman’s written confession that cash and revenue in the published numbers were not real, kept there so a weak quarter would not invite a takeover; an SEC civil settlement with the company for $10 million and an injunction, without a U.S. criminal conviction of Raju; PCAOB and SEC civil sanctions on the India audit firms for confirmation failures that helped the cash fiction survive; a 14-year SEBI market ban and a disgorgement direction; and a 2015 Hyderabad conviction of Raju and nine others on conspiracy, cheating, and related counts. The Archive files those doors as documented / L2.
