RECORDING
SEC//WIRE//011
RESTRICTED
> THE WIRE_
Live log of amendments, new files, and evidence entering the archive
FINANCE & BANKINGLehman Brothers Repo 105Valukas: Repo 105 dressed the balance sheet at quarter-end—an accounting disguise, not a footnote.// Jenner & Block — Examiner's Report news/host page- FINANCE & BANKINGLehman Brothers Repo 105Valukas: Repo 105 dressed the balance sheet at quarter-end—an accounting disguise, not a footnote.// Valukas Examiner's Report — Volume 4
- FINANCE & BANKINGLehman Brothers Repo 105Valukas: Repo 105 dressed the balance sheet at quarter-end—an accounting disguise, not a footnote.// Valukas Examiner's Report — Volume 1
- FINANCE & BANKINGLehman Brothers Repo 105Valukas: Repo 105 dressed the balance sheet at quarter-end—an accounting disguise, not a footnote.// Valukas Examiner's Report — Volume 3 (Repo 105)
- FINANCE & BANKINGLehman Brothers Repo 105Valukas: Repo 105 dressed the balance sheet at quarter-end—an accounting disguise, not a footnote.// Examiner's Report — Stanford menu (public volume index)
FINANCE & BANKINGBarings Bank Collapse (Nick Leeson)BoBS HC 673: unauthorized Singapore losses in 88888—and a comprehensive control failure, not one-man magic.// BoE Quarterly Bulletin — August 1995 issue PDF- FINANCE & BANKINGBarings Bank Collapse (Nick Leeson)BoBS HC 673: unauthorized Singapore losses in 88888—and a comprehensive control failure, not one-man magic.// BoE Quarterly Bulletin — International regulatory co-operation post-Barings (1996 Q2)
- FINANCE & BANKINGBarings Bank Collapse (Nick Leeson)BoBS HC 673: unauthorized Singapore losses in 88888—and a comprehensive control failure, not one-man magic.// RBA Bulletin — Implications of the Barings Collapse (Nov 1995)
- FINANCE & BANKINGBarings Bank Collapse (Nick Leeson)BoBS HC 673: unauthorized Singapore losses in 88888—and a comprehensive control failure, not one-man magic.// Bank of England Court minutes (Jul–Dec 1995)
- FINANCE & BANKINGBarings Bank Collapse (Nick Leeson)BoBS HC 673: unauthorized Singapore losses in 88888—and a comprehensive control failure, not one-man magic.// GOV.UK landing — Report into the collapse of Barings Bank
- FINANCE & BANKINGBarings Bank Collapse (Nick Leeson)BoBS HC 673: unauthorized Singapore losses in 88888—and a comprehensive control failure, not one-man magic.// Board of Banking Supervision — Barings collapse report (HC 673, 18 Jul 1995)
FINANCE & BANKINGBretton Woods Exit and the Nixon ShockCamp David closed the gold window on purpose—FRUS shows managed exit, not accidental panic.// American Presidency Project — The Challenge of Peace (15 Aug 1971)- FINANCE & BANKINGBretton Woods Exit and the Nixon ShockCamp David closed the gold window on purpose—FRUS shows managed exit, not accidental panic.// Nixon Library Almanac — August 15, 1971
- FINANCE & BANKINGBretton Woods Exit and the Nixon ShockCamp David closed the gold window on purpose—FRUS shows managed exit, not accidental panic.// FRUS Vol. III Document 165 — Nixon–Shultz (11 Aug 1971)
- FINANCE & BANKINGBretton Woods Exit and the Nixon ShockCamp David closed the gold window on purpose—FRUS shows managed exit, not accidental panic.// FRUS Vol. III Document 168 — NEP / Camp David editorial note
- FINANCE & BANKINGBretton Woods Exit and the Nixon ShockCamp David closed the gold window on purpose—FRUS shows managed exit, not accidental panic.// FRUS 1969–76 Vol. III — volume summary
- FINANCE & BANKINGBretton Woods Exit and the Nixon ShockCamp David closed the gold window on purpose—FRUS shows managed exit, not accidental panic.// State Historian Milestone — Nixon and the End of Bretton Woods
GOVERNMENT & POLITICSDanske Bank Estonia Money LaunderingBruun & Hjejle, Danish FSA, and DOJ show group knowledge and a delayed stop—not a Tallinn surprise.// Danske Bank company announcement — coordinated resolutions (13 Dec 2022)- GOVERNMENT & POLITICSDanske Bank Estonia Money LaunderingBruun & Hjejle, Danish FSA, and DOJ show group knowledge and a delayed stop—not a Tallinn surprise.// DOJ / SDNY — Danske Bank guilty plea press release (Dec 2022)
- GOVERNMENT & POLITICSDanske Bank Estonia Money LaunderingBruun & Hjejle, Danish FSA, and DOJ show group knowledge and a delayed stop—not a Tallinn surprise.// Danish FSA — supervision report on the Estonia case
- GOVERNMENT & POLITICSDanske Bank Estonia Money LaunderingBruun & Hjejle, Danish FSA, and DOJ show group knowledge and a delayed stop—not a Tallinn surprise.// Danish FSA — management/control decision (3 May 2018)
- GOVERNMENT & POLITICSDanske Bank Estonia Money LaunderingBruun & Hjejle, Danish FSA, and DOJ show group knowledge and a delayed stop—not a Tallinn surprise.// Danske Bank press release — investigation findings (19 Sep 2018)
- GOVERNMENT & POLITICSDanske Bank Estonia Money LaunderingBruun & Hjejle, Danish FSA, and DOJ show group knowledge and a delayed stop—not a Tallinn surprise.// Bruun & Hjejle — Non-Resident Portfolio report (19 Sep 2018)
FINANCE & BANKINGThe 2008 Credit Ratings FailureSEC exams, FCIC, and Senate PSI treat issuer-pays AAA as an essential cog—not mere model error.// Senate PSI hearing — Role of Credit Rating Agencies (23 April 2010)- FINANCE & BANKINGThe 2008 Credit Ratings FailureSEC exams, FCIC, and Senate PSI treat issuer-pays AAA as an essential cog—not mere model error.// Senate PSI — Anatomy of a Financial Collapse (13 April 2011)