Browse all theories tagged with this keyword
Danske Bank's Estonian Non-Resident Portfolio moved roughly €200B-scale flows (2007–15) under thin AML controls. Bruun & Hjejle (2018), Danish FSA orders and supervision findings, and the 2022 DOJ bank-fraud conspiracy plea document group knowledge, weak controls, and delayed stop—not a lone branch accident.
The Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations’ July 2012 HSBC case history documented severe anti-money-laundering and sanctions-control failures. In December 2012 HSBC entered a DOJ deferred prosecution agreement forfeiting $1.256 billion with a detailed Statement of Facts—resolution of charges, not exoneration of the admitted conduct.
In 2014 BNP Paribas agreed to plead guilty to conspiring to violate U.S. sanctions laws by processing U.S. dollar transactions for Sudanese, Iranian, and Cuban sanctioned parties, with a multi-regulator penalty stack near $8.9 billion. DOJ, NYDFS, Federal Reserve, and OFAC papers document message-stripping clearing methods. The Archive keeps settlement admissions separate from viral atrocity captions not adjudicated in the plea.
LIBOR was published as an average of what banks said they would pay to borrow. Barclays admitted its submitters moved quotes for derivatives traders and so the bank would not look weak, and it paid $160 million under a non-prosecution agreement plus a $200 million CFTC order and a £59.5 million FSA fine. Those are settlements. They are not a conviction of the bank and not convictions of unnamed individuals.
On 18 February 2009 UBS AG entered a DOJ Tax deferred prosecution agreement in S.D. Florida resolving a § 371 conspiracy information for facilitating undeclared U.S. Swiss accounts, agreeing to pay $780 million and exit the cross-border business. DPA PDF, DOJ announcement, CourtListener docket, DiCicco PSI testimony, and IRS IR-2009-75 document the spine. Contested HOLD: settlement ≠ exoneration.