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Bankruptcy examiner Anton R. Valukas's March 2010 report reconstructs Lehman's Repo 105/108 trades that temporarily removed assets to shrink reported net leverage at quarter-end. Volumes 1, 3, and 4 document the sale-treatment device, leverage targeting, and colorable-claims analysis—accounting disguise of risk, not a claim that Repo 105 alone caused 2008.
Structured RMBS and CDOs needed NRSRO investment-grade stamps to clear institutional rules. SEC July 2008 staff exams, the FCIC Final Report, and Senate PSI Anatomy findings document issuer-pays conflicts, documentation gaps, and cliff downgrades—rating agencies as essential cogs, not a single wrong spreadsheet.
After Russia's August 1998 shock, FRBNY facilitated a private creditor consortium that recapitalized Long-Term Capital Management. McDonough and Greenspan testimony plus the April 1999 PWG report document systemic-risk justification, no public funds, and leverage/disclosure lessons—too-big-to-fail private rescue politics under official auspices.
Insolvent savings and loans were kept open while regulatory accounting, income-capital certificates, and in some cases land flips hid how bad the assets were, because the insurance fund could not afford to close them. FIRREA and the Resolution Trust Corporation later resolved 747 thrifts and presented a public bill. Fraud at particular institutions is part of that record. It is not a single plot for the whole industry.