Two denials. Account statements showed securities transactions that had not been made. The examinations the Commission ran did not catch that. On 10 December 2008 Bernard L. Madoff, sole owner of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities and a former chairman of the NASDAQ board, told two senior employees he was finished, had absolutely nothing, that it was all just one big lie, and that it was basically a giant Ponzi scheme. He said returns to some investors had been paid from principal received from others, that the business had been insolvent for years, and that he estimated losses at approximately $50 billion. A later charging instrument puts a different number on the November 2008 statements. This page does not merge them.
Statements for Trades That Were Not Trades
The information in United States v. Bernard L. Madoff, 09 Cr. 213, charges that from at least the 1980s through 11 December 2008 he solicited billions on the promise the money would be invested, did not invest it that way, and converted funds. Tens of thousands of account statements and trade confirmations, sent through the Postal Service, showed securities transactions that were not executed. The information calls it a Ponzi scheme and charges false SEC filings and false audit certifications. As of 30 November 2008 the firm had about 4,800 client accounts. Statements dated on or about 1 December 2008 reported a total balance of approximately $64.8 billion. The information says the firm held only a small fraction of that balance. DOJ — information, United States v. Bernard L. Madoff, 09 Cr. 213 (10 March 2009): https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/file/762721/dl?inline=
What He Told Them, and What the Commission Printed
The civil complaint of 11 December 2008 is the door for the apartment sentences and for the estimate of approximately $50 billion. A January 2008 Form ADV reported over $17 billion under management and 23 clients. Early that December he told one senior employee of about $7 billion in redemptions; that employee had understood the book at about $8 to $15 billion. He said he would surrender in about a week and use roughly $200 to $300 million left for selected employees, family, and friends. The complaint alleges Advisers Act sections 206(1) and 206(2), Securities Act section 17(a), and Exchange Act section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
Press release 2008-293 states the loss estimate as at least $50 billion and says virtually all advisory assets appeared missing. Its biography adds NASD vice chairman and chairman of the New York region. “At least $50 billion” stays on the release. It is not the information’s $64.8 billion.
SEC — complaint, SEC v. Bernard L. Madoff (11 December 2008): https://www.sec.gov/files/litigation/complaints/2008/comp-madoff121108.pdf
SEC — press release 2008-293: https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-293.htm
What the Exams Actually Failed to Do
Inspector General Report OIG-509, 31 August 2009, is the missed-warning record. Chairman Cox asked for it the night of 16 December 2008. The introduction notes the 11 December charges, a guilty plea on 12 March 2009, and a 150-year sentence by Judge Denny Chin on 29 June 2009. The report found no evidence of an inappropriate connection that influenced the exams, including a relationship between an employee and Shana Madoff, and no evidence senior officials steered the work. It found that despite three examinations and two investigations, a thorough competent one was never performed. Six complaints arrived from June 1992 to December 2008. One was resubmitted in May 2000, March 2001, and October 2005. The 2005 title was “The World’s Largest Hedge Fund is a Fraud,” with about 30 red flags, calling a Ponzi scheme highly likely. Harry Markopolos is the complainant and author of those three submissions. The staff never verified trading with an independent third party and never ran a Ponzi examination.
In 1992 the staff suspected a Ponzi scheme at Avellino & Bienes, learned the money was with Madoff, got customers repaid, examined him briefly, and took depository records from him rather than from the Depository Trust Company. In 2004 and 2005 two exams ran at once, inexperienced, scoped to front-running, each unaware of the other until he told them. Letters to the NASD and to a European counterparty were drafted and not sent. A clearing firm said an account had no activity; that was not followed up. Enforcement, skeptical of the complainant, focused on registration, turned down his file, caught lies, and did not follow them. On 19 May 2006 he testified that advisory trades cleared through his DTC account. He later told the Inspector General he thought he had been caught and was astonished they did not call DTC. The matter effectively ended in August 2006 when he registered as an adviser, and was officially closed in January 2008.
SEC OIG — Report OIG-509 (31 August 2009): https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oig/reports/investigations/2009/oig-509.pdf
The Depository Arithmetic, Done Later
The executive summary records the comparison the exams did not make. One feeder-fund statement for January 2005 showed about $2.5 billion of S&P 100 equities as of 31 January 2005. DTC that day showed the firm held less than $18 million of those equities. On the 19 May 2006 testimony date DTC showed less than $24 million, and on 10 August 2006 less than $28 million. A footnote says those were the firm’s own positions. After the collapse an SEC attorney said a few days and a phone call to DTC confirmed the investors’ trades had not been placed. The $2.5 billion line is not the complaint’s $50 billion and not the information’s $64.8 billion.
The same summary notes that the Northeast office declined the 2001 complaint one day after it arrived. MARHedge had reported net annual returns of roughly 15 percent with losses in only four of 139 months. That article is context in the summary, not a second loss total.
SEC OIG — executive summary of OIG-509: https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2009/oig-509-exec-summary.pdf
How Complaints Were Dropped
Audit Report No. 467, 29 September 2009, listed twelve findings. Complaint guidance was inadequate. The 2001 submission was dropped the next day. The 2005 complaint was not sufficiently reviewed; motives were questioned because the author was neither employee nor investor, and a December 2005 offer of more material was not taken up. The team had virtually no Ponzi experience, skipped Trading and Markets and International Affairs, and failed to verify with FINRA, the Chicago Board Options Exchange, or DTC. A June 2007 email was ignored while the case was inactive. Enforcement later concurred in all 21 recommendations.
SEC OIG — audit Report No. 467 (29 September 2009): https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oig/reports/audits/2009/467.pdf
What the Paper Trail Settles
Documented: statements for trades the information says were not made; approximately $50 billion in the complaint and at least $50 billion in the press release; approximately $64.8 billion on the November 2008 statements in the information; an Inspector General finding that the exams never verified trading at an independent third party; a later DTC comparison of about $2.5 billion against less than $18 million; and an audit that the 2001 complaint died in a day. Madoff appears as defendant, chairman, and sole owner. Markopolos appears as complainant and author. The Archive files the missed warnings as documented / L2.
