Leaked slides tied NSA's PRISM to Google and Apple; officials said it was not undisclosed, and the firms denied knowing.
What was kept from the public until June 2013 was the program itself: its name, the companies feeding it and when each began, its cost, and an internal presentation that described collection "directly from the servers." The means was top secret classification and written directives under Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act that compelled providers to hand over communications; the oversight board later wrote that the providers' names had still not been declassified. The reasons the government gave were national security and the protection of sources and methods; the director of national intelligence called the disclosure "reprehensible."
The Guardian, 6 June 2013
The Guardian report by Glenn Greenwald and Ewen MacAskill says the NSA obtained direct access to the systems of Google, Facebook, Apple and other US internet companies, according to a 41-slide top secret presentation it said it had verified, dating to April 2013. It says the program, previously undisclosed, let officials collect search history, email content, file transfers and live chats, and that collection began with Microsoft in December 2007, followed by Yahoo in 2008; Google, Facebook and PalTalk in 2009; YouTube in 2010; Skype and AOL in 2011; and Apple in 2012. It quotes the presentation that "Fisa was broken because it provided privacy protections to people who were not entitled to them." It says every company that answered denied knowledge of any such program, quoting Google that it "does not have a back door for the government to access private user data," and it prints a senior administration official's statement that Section 702 does not allow the targeting of any US citizen or anyone in the United States.
The Guardian, June 2013: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data
The slides
The presentation, as reproduced by the National Security Archive, is headed "PRISM/US-984XN Overview," dated April 2013 and marked TOP SECRET//SI//ORCON//NOFORN, and calls PRISM "The SIGAD Used Most in NSA Reporting." It lists current providers as Microsoft, Google, Yahoo!, Facebook, PalTalk, YouTube, Skype and AOL, and types of collection including email, chat, video, photos, stored data, VoIP, file transfers and online social networking details. One slide gives "PRISM Program Cost: $20M per year." Another sets out two types of collection under FAA 702: "Upstream," on fiber cables as data flows past, and PRISM, "Collection directly from the servers of these U.S. Service Providers," with the advice "You Should Use Both." A tasking chart routes selectors to providers through the FBI's Data Intercept Technology Unit.
NSA slides, April 2013: https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB436/docs/EBB-055.pdf
The first official answer, 6 June
James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, issued a statement on 6 June 2013 saying the Guardian and Washington Post articles on Section 702 collection "contain numerous inaccuracies." It says Section 702 cannot be used to intentionally target any US citizen, any other US person, or anyone located within the United States, and that it is overseen by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, the Executive Branch and Congress. It calls the program "important and entirely legal," and says its unauthorized disclosure "is reprehensible and risks important protections for the security of Americans."
DNI statement, 6 June 2013: https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB436/docs/EBB-064.pdf
The fact sheet, 8 June
The ODNI fact sheet of 8 June 2013 opens: "PRISM is not an undisclosed collection or data mining program." It calls PRISM an internal government computer system used to facilitate court-supervised collection from electronic communication service providers, and says the authority "has been widely known and publicly discussed since its inception in 2008." It says the government "does not unilaterally obtain information from the servers" of US providers; information is obtained with FISA Court approval "and with the knowledge of the provider based upon a written directive from the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence." It says the court must approve targeting and minimization procedures, and that collection has yielded intelligence on terrorist networks, proliferation and cyber threats.
ODNI fact sheet, 8 June 2013: https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB436/docs/EBB-070.pdf
Two senators on a correction, 24 June
Senators Ron Wyden and Mark Udall wrote to General Keith Alexander, director of the NSA, on 24 June 2013 that an NSA fact sheet on Section 702, the authority that "involves the PRISM computer system," contained an inaccurate statement that "portrays protections for Americans' privacy as being significantly stronger than they actually are." They wrote that they had identified it in a classified attachment and urged a correction. They called a second statement "somewhat misleading," noting that the intelligence community had told them it was "not reasonably possible to identify the number of people located in the United States whose communications may have been reviewed."
Wyden and Udall letter, 24 June 2013: https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB436/docs/EBB-085.pdf
The oversight board, July 2014
The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board's report on the Section 702 program, dated 2 July 2014, says that once collection is authorized the government sends written directives to providers "compelling their assistance." In PRISM collection the FBI, on behalf of the NSA, sends a selector such as an email address to a US provider served with a directive, and the provider "is compelled to give the communications sent to or from that selector." The NSA receives all PRISM data, and the CIA and FBI receive portions. It says that as of mid-2011, 91 percent of the internet communications the NSA acquired each year came through PRISM, and that "the government has not declassified the specific ISPs that have been served directives." The board concludes that PRISM collection is clearly authorized by statute, while incidental collection of US persons' communications and queries for specific Americans "push the program close to the line of constitutional reasonableness."
PCLOB report, July 2014: https://documents.pclob.gov/prod/Documents/OversightReport/823399ae-92ea-447a-ab60-0da28b555437/702-Report-2.pdf
What was hidden
The slides were top secret with no foreign distribution, and the companies' role ran through compulsory directives whose recipients remained classified in 2014. After the leak, the intelligence director called the reports inaccurate and the fact sheet said PRISM was not undisclosed, while companies told the Guardian they knew of no such program; the board's report describes providers compelled under directives, and two senators said one official account overstated privacy protections. The reasons given were national security and the protection of a program officials called valuable and lawful.