The denial was in the manuals and in the training case. MCAS was left out of the flight manuals U.S. airlines used, and the training path was built so pilots qualified on the 737 Next Generation would not have to enter a simulator. The Justice Department’s 7 January 2021 resolution says two 737 MAX flight technical pilots deceived the FAA Aircraft Evaluation Group about MCAS. Because of that, the group deleted MCAS from the Flight Standardization Board Report published in July 2017, and U.S. airline manuals and pilot-training materials contained none. A June 2020 Inspector General timeline says FAA approved Boeing’s Level B training for MAX pilots already qualified on the 737-800, matching a goal of a common type rating from the NG to the MAX and of avoiding simulator training. MCAS response was not in that training. The why on those doors is the common rating and the training schedule. Two crashes followed: Lion Air 610 on 29 October 2018 and Ethiopian 302 on 10 March 2019. These records do not contain a third.
What the Certification Assumed
The June 2020 Inspector General report says Boeing built MCAS to offset the larger engines, and their placement, relative to the 737 NG. It can move the stabilizer without pilot input and lower the nose. The safety analysis did not class the system-level risk as catastrophic, so MCAS used one angle-of-attack sensor. Early briefings called it a limited change to speed trim, and it was not an emphasis item for FAA engineers. After flight test, Boeing increased how far MCAS could drive the nose down and did not submit documents on that change. Certification engineers and the training approvers told the Inspector General they did not know of the revision. Formal assessments arrived only in November 2016 and January 2017. The amended type certificate was issued in March 2017. A 23 February 2021 Inspector General report says the established process still left a significant misunderstanding of MCAS, identified as contributing to both accidents, and that FAA lacked a complete understanding of the MCAS safety assessments until after the first accident.
DOT Office of Inspector General — timeline of 737 MAX 8 certification, report AV2020037, 29 June 2020: https://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/default/files/FAA%20Oversight%20of%20Boeing%20737%20MAX%20Certification%20Timeline%20Final%20Report.pdf
DOT Office of Inspector General — certification and delegation weaknesses, report AV2021020, 23 February 2021: https://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/default/files/FAA%20Certification%20of%20737%20MAX%20Boeing%20II%20Final%20Report%5E2-23-2021.pdf
What Pilots Were Not Shown
The House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee’s final report records a 2013 internal note: “Every new buzzword represents a company and airline cost via changed manuals, changed training, changed maintenance manuals,” and a recommendation to study “deletion of MCAS nomenclature” under “revised speed trim,” so certification and training impact would not grow. Then-chief executive Dennis Muilenburg wrote the committee that “MCAS is an extension of the pre-existing Speed Trim function.” The report says the AOA Disagree alert was inoperable on most of the fleet, while a Lion Air manual dated 16 August 2018 still described it as working. The Justice Department says the two pilots learned of an important MCAS change around November 2016 and concealed it, so the July 2017 report and the manuals had no MCAS. The company resolved one conspiracy count by a deferred prosecution agreement: over $2.5 billion, of which $243.6 million was a criminal penalty, $1.77 billion went to airline customers, and $500 million funded beneficiaries of the 346 dead. The department says the conduct was not facilitated by senior management. That limit is the department’s. It does not put MCAS back into the manuals.
Department of Justice — Boeing charged in a 737 MAX fraud conspiracy, 7 January 2021: https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/boeing-charged-737-max-fraud-conspiracy-and-agrees-pay-over-25-billion
House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure — final report, The Design, Development, and Certification of the Boeing 737 MAX (GovInfo): https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GOVPUB-Y4_T68_2-PURL-gpo144993/pdf/GOVPUB-Y4_T68_2-PURL-gpo144993.pdf
The Two Crashes
Lion Air 610 crashed on 29 October 2018 into the Java Sea. All 189 aboard died. Ethiopian 302 crashed on 10 March 2019 near Ejere. All 157 aboard died. The Justice Department says the FAA group learned after Lion Air that MCAS had activated and may have played a role, and learned only then of the concealed change; after Ethiopian it again learned MCAS had activated and may have played a role. The FAA grounded the MAX in the United States on 13 March 2019. The June 2020 Inspector General report cites the Indonesian investigation for 24 MCAS activations and, in its own summary, says erroneous angle-of-attack data drove MCAS more than 20 times before the crew lost control. It says Ethiopian interim reports pointed to MCAS as a potential factor while that investigation was still open. No third crash is in these doors.
What the Safety Board Said the Assumptions Missed
The NTSB’s 19 September 2019 report, and its 26 September letter, say FAA guidance on pilot response to failures such as unintended MCAS “do not adequately consider” multiple flight-deck alerts. Recommendation A-19-10 says MAX assessments that assumed immediate, appropriate pilot reaction to uncommanded MCAS inputs must be redone with those alerts in view. As delivered, the report says, MCAS activated in manual flight, flaps up, from either angle-of-attack sensor, and Boeing classed uncommanded operation to maximum authority as “major.” The simulator work Boeing described moved the stabilizer as MCAS would, and did not simulate an erroneous high angle-of-attack input. The crews’ responses did not match the certification assumption.
National Transportation Safety Board — safety recommendation letter A-19-10 through A-19-16, 26 September 2019: https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-recs/recletters/A-19-010-016.pdf
National Transportation Safety Board — “Assumptions Used in the Safety Assessment Process and the Effects of Multiple Alerts and Indications on Pilot Performance,” 19 September 2019: https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/ASR1901.pdf
What the Record Settles
Documented: MCAS was omitted from the U.S. manuals and from the July 2017 standardization report after Boeing pilots concealed a change from the FAA evaluation group; Level B differences training preserved a common type rating with the 737 NG and did not require simulator training on MCAS; the AOA Disagree alert was, on the House record, inoperable on most of the fleet while a Lion Air manual still described it; Lion Air 610 and Ethiopian 302 were the two fatal flights, 189 and 157 dead; and the safety assessments assumed a pilot response the NTSB says the alerts made unrealistic. The company resolved a conspiracy charge by a deferred prosecution agreement. The Archive files those doors as documented / L2.
