Merck called Vioxx safe and blamed the comparison drug for heart attacks, until its own trial ended sales in 2004. The cover-up charge against Vioxx is about what was known and when. The painkiller reached the US market in 1999 and sold $2.5 billion worldwide in 2003. Signals of heart risk appeared in Merck's own trials years before the drug was pulled, and the company's public answer was that the drug was safe and that naproxen, the painkiller it was compared against, protected the heart. A leading medical journal later said heart attack data had been left out of the key paper. An FDA scientist told the Senate his agency had failed. And in 2011 Merck paid nearly a billion dollars and pleaded guilty over how it sold the drug.
The withdrawal
On 30 September 2004 Merck announced a voluntary worldwide withdrawal of Vioxx, effective immediately. The decision rested on three-year data from APPROVe, a placebo-controlled trial testing whether Vioxx 25 mg prevented the return of colorectal polyps. The trial showed an increased relative risk of confirmed cardiovascular events, such as heart attack and stroke, beginning after 18 months of treatment. Chief executive Raymond Gilmartin said: "We are taking this action because we believe it best serves the interests of patients." He added that the company believed it could have kept selling the drug with new labeling, but chose withdrawal given the alternatives and "the questions raised by the data." The release noted Vioxx had been sold in more than 80 countries.
Merck & Co., "Merck Announces Voluntary Worldwide Withdrawal of VIOXX" (30 September 2004), Wayback copy: https://web.archive.org/web/20120417053059/http://www.merck.com:80/newsroom/vioxx/pdf/vioxx_press_release_final.pdf
What the FDA said that day
The FDA published questions and answers the same day. Asked whether it had required the action, the agency answered: "No, Merck made this decision independent of input from FDA." It said it had not reviewed the stopped study in the depth Merck had, but agreed "there appear to be significant safety concerns for patients, particularly those taking the drug chronically." It issued a public health advisory, told patients the risk to any individual was very small, and advised them to talk to their doctors about alternatives. The new study, it said, showed Vioxx "may cause an increased risk in cardiovascular events such as heart attack and strokes during chronic use."
FDA, "Vioxx (rofecoxib) Questions and Answers" (30 September 2004), Wayback copy: https://web.archive.org/web/20260511145403/https://www.fda.gov/drugs/postmarket-drug-safety-information-patients-and-providers/vioxx-rofecoxib-questions-and-answers
An FDA scientist testifies
On 18 November 2004 David Graham, associate director for science and medicine in the FDA's Office of Drug Safety, testified before the Senate Finance Committee. He laid out the timeline. Before approval, he said, a Merck study named 090 found nearly a sevenfold increase in heart attack risk with low-dose Vioxx, and the label at approval said nothing about it. In November 2000 the VIGOR trial found a fivefold increase with high-dose Vioxx, and "the company said the drug was safe and that the comparison drug naproxen, was protective." A large 2002 epidemiologic study found a twofold increase with high doses, and another found naproxen did not affect heart attack risk. About 18 months after VIGOR, he said, the FDA changed the label but did not put the risk in the warnings section or ban the high dose.
Graham put the likely number of excess cases in the US at 88,000 to 139,000 Americans, of whom he said 30 to 40 percent probably died. He called Vioxx "a terrible tragedy and a profound regulatory failure" and said "the FDA, as currently configured, is incapable of protecting America against another Vioxx."
Testimony of David J. Graham, Senate Finance Committee (18 November 2004), Wayback copy: https://web.archive.org/web/20260214122903/https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/111804dgtest.pdf
The journal's charge
In December 2005 the New England Journal of Medicine published an expression of concern about the VIGOR paper it had printed on 23 November 2000, and in March 2006 its editors reaffirmed it. They wrote that the article "did not accurately represent the safety data available to the authors." More than four months before publication, they said, at least two authors knew of data on cardiovascular events that were left out, data contained in an internal Merck memorandum. The data showed 47 confirmed serious thromboembolic events in the Vioxx group and 20 in the naproxen group. The editors said the memo's information reached the FDA's website three months after publication but was never given to the journal during review, and concluded that "conclusions regarding the safety of rofecoxib were misleading."
NEJM, "Expression of Concern Reaffirmed" (March 2006), Wayback copy: https://web.archive.org/web/20231205165201/https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMe068054
The ghostwriting files
In April 2008 JAMA published two studies built on documents unsealed in Vioxx litigation, one on guest authorship and ghostwriting and one on how mortality data were analyzed. In an accompanying editorial, editors Catherine DeAngelis and Phil Fontanarosa wrote that the articles gave "a glimpse of one company's apparent misrepresentation of research data and its manipulation of clinical research articles and clinical reviews." They described an internal company analysis, using intention-to-treat methods, that showed a significantly increased mortality risk among patients assigned to Vioxx, and they wrote that for at least one trial company documents showed no data and safety monitoring board in place.
JAMA editorial, DeAngelis and Fontanarosa, "Impugning the Integrity of Medical Science" (April 2008): https://depts.washington.edu/uwbri/PDF%20Files/DeAngelisFontanarosa2008_JAMA%7BIntegrityofMedSci%7D.pdf
The guilty plea
In November 2011 the Justice Department announced that Merck Sharp & Dohme would pay $950 million to resolve criminal charges and civil claims over its promotion and marketing of Vioxx. The company agreed to plead guilty to a misdemeanor for promoting Vioxx to treat rheumatoid arthritis before the FDA approved that use, with a criminal fine of $321.6 million. The civil settlement of $628.4 million resolved allegations that Merck made inaccurate, unsupported, or misleading statements about Vioxx's cardiovascular safety to increase sales, and that its representatives misled doctors.
US Department of Justice, Merck Sharp & Dohme to pay nearly one billion dollars over promotion of Vioxx (22 November 2011): https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/us-pharmaceutical-company-merck-sharp-dohme-pay-nearly-one-billion-dollars-over-promotion
What was hidden, and why
What was hidden was heart-attack data, left out of a landmark paper and answered in public with the naproxen explanation. The record's reason is sales: the government alleged misleading safety claims made to sell the drug.
