In 1962 the Joint Chiefs proposed staged attacks as a pretext to invade Cuba; the memo stayed secret until 1997.
The record runs from the Joint Chiefs' memorandum of 13 March 1962 and the Mongoose guidelines that followed it, through the National Archives' advisory of November 1997 and the Assassination Records Review Board's final report, to the National Security Archive's posting and an ABC News report of 2001. What was hidden was a list of faked provocations drafted by the nation's senior officers; the means was a Top Secret classification and a narrow distribution; the reason printed in the memo itself is justification for US military intervention in Cuba.
The memorandum of 13 March 1962
The memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, subject "Justification for US Military Intervention in Cuba (TS)," is signed for the Joint Chiefs of Staff by their chairman, L. L. Lemnitzer. It answers a request from the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, for "brief but precise description of pretexts which would provide justification for US military intervention in Cuba," and recommends that the attached paper go forward as "a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes," with responsibility for overt and covert military operations given to the Joint Chiefs. A note by the Joint Secretariat of 12 March 1962, JCS 1969/321, carries the heading NORTHWOODS. The paper asks that it not be forwarded to the commanders of unified or specified commands, to US officers at NATO, or to the US delegation on the United Nations Military Staff Committee.
Its annex, "Pretexts to Justify US Military Intervention in Cuba," lists incidents at Guantanamo staged by "friendly Cubans," including mortar fire into the base, sabotage and "funerals for mock-victims." It offers a "Remember the Maine" incident: "We could blow up a US ship in Guantanamo Bay and blame Cuba," adding that "casualty lists in US newspapers would cause a helpful wave of national indignation." It proposes "a Communist Cuban terror campaign in the Miami area, in other Florida cities and even in Washington," the sinking of "a boatload of Cubans enroute to Florida (real or simulated)," plastic bombs, and a drone made to look like a chartered airliner shot down over Cuba. The aim, it says, was to place the United States "in the apparent position of suffering defensible grievances" and to "camouflage the ultimate objective."
Joint Chiefs memorandum, 13 March 1962: https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/sites/default/files/2022-10/Joint-Chiefs-pretexts-to-invade-Cuba-March-1962_0.pdf
The guidelines of 14 March and the meeting of 16 March
The State Department's Foreign Relations series prints the "Guidelines for Operation Mongoose" of 14 March 1962. They assume that final success "will require decisive U.S. military intervention" and that indigenous resources will be used "to prepare for and justify this intervention," while other actions stop short of anything "reasonably calculated to inspire a revolt" or that would require armed intervention. An editorial note quotes U. Alexis Johnson's covering memorandum of 16 March, written after a meeting with the President at which General Lemnitzer was present. The President "expressed skepticism" that circumstances would arise to justify "the use of American forces for overt military action," and "it was clearly understood no decision was expressed or implied approving the use of such forces although contingency planning would proceed."
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, vol. X, doc. 314: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d314
The release of November 1997
A National Archives media advisory dated 17 November 1997 announced that on 18 November it would open 84 newly declassified documents, about 1,500 pages, from the files of Joint Chiefs chairmen Lemnitzer, Taylor and Wheeler, the central files of the Joint Chiefs, and the papers of Joseph Califano. It says the records relate to US policy towards Cuba, 1962–64, and were identified and reviewed by the Assassination Records Review Board for the JFK Collection created under the 1992 Act.
National Archives media advisory, 17 November 1997: https://www.archives.gov/press/press-releases/1998/nr98-16
The Review Board's account
The Review Board's final report says it sought Cuba records because evidence of "serious, or imminent, contingency plans to invade Cuba" could suggest a motive for retaliation by Castro or for domestic malcontents displeased that such plans were not carried out, and because of strong public interest in Cuba policy. It records that the Joint Staff Secretariat flagged records from the chairmen's files, and that 147 records were selected for the JFK Collection, about two-thirds on Cuba policy from 1961 to 1964. It quotes Lemnitzer's memorandum to McNamara of 10 April 1962: "The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the Cuban problem must be solved in the near future."
Assassination Records Review Board, Final Report: https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/review-board/report/arrb-final-report.pdf
The National Security Archive, April 2001
The National Security Archive posted the memorandum on 30 April 2001, noting that James Bamford's book Body of Secrets highlights proposals codenamed OPERATION NORTHWOODS. It says the document was provided to McNamara on 13 March 1962 as the key component of Northwoods, was written in response to a request from Edward Lansdale, and was part of the secret anti-Castro program known as Operation Mongoose. It quotes Bamford's view that Northwoods "may be the most corrupt plan ever created by the U.S. government."
National Security Archive, 30 April 2001: https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/news/20010430/
ABC News, April 2001
David Ruppe's ABC News report says the plans had the written approval of all the Joint Chiefs and were presented to McNamara in March 1962, but "apparently were rejected by the civilian leadership and have gone undisclosed for nearly 40 years." It quotes Bamford telling ABCNEWS.com that the documents were held secret so long because the Joint Chiefs "never wanted to give these up because they were so embarrassing."
ABC News, 30 April 2001: https://abcnews.com/US/story?id=92662
What was hidden, how, and why
As these doors print it, the hidden matter was a set of proposals by the Joint Chiefs for staged attacks, false-flag terror and faked casualties to be blamed on Cuba. The means was a Top Secret paper kept from the unified and specified commands, NATO officers and the UN delegation, and later a classified file opened only in 1997 through the Review Board. The reason the memo gives is a pretext for US military intervention in Cuba; the President's recorded position was that no use of US forces was approved, and ABC reports that the plans were apparently rejected.
