Airline puts spiked before 9/11; adherents read foreknowledge, while the Commission and SEC found no tie to the attacks. The records agree on the spikes: put volume in UAL Corp., parent of United Airlines, jumped on 6 September 2001, and put volume in AMR Corp., parent of American Airlines, jumped on 10 September. Two academic papers call the activity consistent with informed trading. The Commission, its staff monograph, and its interview notes with the SEC's market surveillance chief say each traced trade had an innocuous explanation.
The Commission's note 130
Note 130 to chapter 5 of the 9/11 Commission Report says highly publicized allegations of insider trading rest on reports of unusual trading in companies whose stock plummeted after the attacks, and that some unusual trading did in fact occur. It says put volume surged in the parent of United Airlines on September 6 and the parent of American Airlines on September 10, "highly suspicious trading on its face," yet further investigation revealed the trading had no connection with 9/11. It says a single U.S.-based institutional investor with no conceivable ties to al Qaeda bought 95 percent of the UAL puts on September 6 as part of a strategy that also included buying 115,000 shares of American on September 10. It says the SEC and the FBI found that the apparently suspicious consistently proved innocuous.
The 9/11 Commission Report, chapter 5, note 130: https://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf
The staff monograph
The Commission's Terrorist Financing Staff Monograph says investigators analyzed trading in 103 companies and 32 index or exchange-traded funds and examined more than 9.5 million securities transactions. It says the government investigation unequivocally concluded that there was no evidence of illicit trading in U.S. markets with knowledge of the attacks. It says UAL put volume on September 6 exceeded call volume by more than 20 times, and that one U.S. investment adviser with $5.3 billion under management bought 95 percent of it as part of a bearish view of the airline industry. It says AMR put volume on September 10 exceeded calls by 6 to 1, that much of the surge traced to a California newsletter, and that 26 of the 28 buyers the SEC interviewed cited it.
Terrorist Financing Staff Monograph, 9/11 Commission: https://www.9-11commission.gov/staff_statements/911_TerrFin_Monograph.pdf
The Commission's SEC interview memo
A Commission Sensitive memorandum for the record summarizes a September 16, 2003, interview with the chief of the SEC's Office of Market Surveillance, who began the trading inquiry on September 12, 2001, with options on UAL and AMR before widening it to 103 companies. It records that the two most suspicious days were September 6, when UAL put volume was 2,075, and September 10, when AMR put volume was 2,282, and that a U.S.-based investment advisor registered with the SEC bought 2,000 UAL puts on September 6, "constituting 96% of the volume." It records that the trader behind that block and the newsletter advisor who recommended AMR puts on September 9 were referred to the FBI even though the SEC was satisfied with their explanations, and that 26 of 28 buyers of the AMR October 30 puts cited the Options Hotline. Follow-up notes of May 2004 put the actual UAL put volume on September 6 at 1,575, not 2,075, because a canceled 500-put sale had been counted, and say the conclusion stands: "there was no evidence of any illicit trading." Its 96 percent differs from the 95 percent in the note and the monograph.
9/11 Commission memorandum for the record, SEC market surveillance interview, September 16, 2003 (NARA release, Cryptome copy): https://cryptome.org/nara/sec/sec-03-0916.pdf
Poteshman's 2006 paper
Allen M. Poteshman of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign published "Unusual Option Market Activity and the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001" in the Journal of Business (University of Chicago Press, vol. 79, no. 4, July 2006, pages 1703–1726). Its abstract says that after September 11 there was a great deal of speculation that the terrorists or their associates had traded in the option market on advance knowledge of the attacks. It says the paper generates systematic information about option market activity that can be used to assess the trading before any event of interest. It says examination of the option trading leading up to September 11 "reveals that there was an unusually high level of put buying," and that "this finding is consistent with informed investors having traded options in advance of the attacks."
Poteshman, Journal of Business, 2006 (RePEc record with abstract): https://ideas.repec.org/a/ucp/jnlbus/v79y2006i4p1703-1726.html
The Zurich paper
"Detecting abnormal trading activities in option markets," by Marc Chesney, Remo Crameri, and Loriano Mancini, in the Journal of Empirical Finance 33 (2015), applies its method to 9.6 million daily option prices of 31 companies, mainly airline, banking, and insurance. It says abnormal trades tend to cluster before events such as merger announcements, earnings statements, and the attacks of September 11th. It says a total gain of almost $3 million was realized within a few trading weeks using options on AMR and UAL, with comparable trades for Boeing. It also says that without trader identities it is not possible to tell whether put trades came from informed traders or from corporate insiders hedging.
Chesney, Crameri, and Mancini, Journal of Empirical Finance, 2015 (author's copy): https://marcchesney.com/site/assets/files/1/detecting_abnormal_trading_activities_m__chesney-_r__crameri-_l__mancini_-_j__of_empirical_finance_-_komplet.pdf
The adherent case
Lars Schall's article on his own site, dated March 20, 2012, and first published at Asia Times Online as an exclusive investigation, opens by saying there can be no dispute that put trading "spiked in the days around September 11, 2001 – even if the US Securities and Exchange Commission and the 9/11 Commission will not say so." It says more than a few people must have had advance warning of the attacks and cashed in to the tune of millions of dollars. It cites Poteshman's conclusion, a 2010 S&P 500 index-option study by Wong, Thompson, and Teh, and a 2010 Zurich paper by Chesney, Crameri, and Mancini. It quotes that paper's figure of more than $16 million in gains on new airline-sector puts, and sets it against the official line that the trades "consistently proved innocuous."
Lars Schall, "Insider trading 9/11 … the facts laid bare," larsschall.de: https://larsschall.de/insider-trading-9-11-the-facts-laid-bare/
The record on the puts
The Commission's note and monograph, the SEC interview memo, and Schall's article print the spikes: UAL on September 6 and AMR on September 10. The Commission's note, the staff monograph, and the SEC interview memo say the big UAL buy came from one U.S. adviser betting against the airlines, that much of the AMR buying followed a newsletter, and that the SEC and FBI found no trading tied to the attacks. Poteshman and the Zurich authors call the activity statistically unusual and consistent with informed trading. Adherents read the papers as proof of foreknowledge; the official finding is that no such trading was found.
