The Gehlen Organization: From Nazi Intel to the BND
NARA 2002 and CIA documentary histories show Army then CIA sponsorship of Gehlen’s eastern-front organization, mid-1949 CIA takeover after debate, and transition to the BND. Not a public alliance at the time. Documented/L1.
The United States used Gehlen’s wartime eastern-front organization; that bargain was not a public alliance. As Nazi Germany collapsed, Generalmajor Reinhard Gehlen, who had led Fremde Heere Ost — Foreign Armies East — for the Wehrmacht’s eastern-front intelligence work, turned himself in to the U.S. Army and offered to continue that work for the United States. The Army sponsored the resulting organization until 1949; the Central Intelligence Agency then took over as main patron after internal debate. Gehlen later became the first head of the West German Bundesnachrichtendienst. The National Archives’ 2002 release and the CIA documentary history are the records of that handover. They do not state a war-crime conviction for Gehlen.
PublishedSep 23, 2026
What the National Archives Said in 2002
On 8 May 2002 the National Archives, for the Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group, described a substantial collection on the origins of the relationship between Gehlen and the United States Government. The press release states that during the war Gehlen had led the intelligence unit that collected and analyzed information on the Eastern Front for Hitler and the Wehrmacht; that in the summer of 1945 he offered to continue the same work for the United States; and that American officials accepted the offer. “The U.S. Army remained Gehlen’s sponsor until 1949, when the Central Intelligence Agency, after much internal debate, took over as Gehlen’s main patron.” The release notes that Gehlen ultimately became the first head of the BND and that relations between the BND and CIA were good, but that in building his organization Gehlen recruited some former members of the SS — a moral problem that also opened pathways for Soviet penetration. Among the released material was the formerly classified two-volume CIA history “Forging an Intelligence Partnership: CIA and the Origins of the BND, 1945-49,” plus name files of associates including former SS officer Heinz Felfe, later exposed as a Soviet mole.
The National Security Archive’s Electronic Briefing Book 146 posts that CIA history and summarizes its introduction: use of Gehlen’s group was a “double edged sword” that “boosted the Warsaw Pact’s propaganda efforts” and “suffered devastating penetrations by the KGB.” The Archive’s posting notes the volumes were presented in 1999 by CIA Deputy Director for Operations Jack Downing to the BND to mark fifty years of CIA–West German cooperation, and were declassified in 2002 through the IWG. The same posting records that documentation unearthed by the IWG showed extensive relationships between Nazi war criminals and American intelligence organizations, including that at least 100 officers within the Gehlen organization were former SD or Gestapo officers — the figure given in the Archive’s note on the IWG record.
Volume 1’s front matter, as released, includes Downing’s foreword: between 1945 and 1949 the U.S. Army handled the Gehlen Organization and funded its intelligence collection; the Army wanted CIA and predecessor organizations to assume responsibility; CIA had reservations; the Agency’s decision to assume responsibility in mid-1949 “was not made lightly and it was reached only after long debate.” Kevin C. Ruffner’s preface states that CIA’s sponsorship of the nascent West German intelligence service in mid-1949 “irrevocably linked the CIA to former members of the General Staff of the defeated Wehrmacht and Nazi Germany’s intelligence services, some of whom had notorious wartime reputations,” after a long-running debate with the Army about supporting a resurrected German General Staff and a quasi-independent national intelligence organization.
The National Security Archive’s Volume II introduction is the second volume of Forging an Intelligence Partnership: CIA and the Origins of the BND, 1945–49. It is not a reprint of the Volume I introduction, and it is not the later 1949–56 compilation. The Archive’s posting places Volume II’s documents in Part V, the Critchfield report, and Part VI, “A Year of Decisions,” through October 1949.
A later CIA book, Forging an Intelligence Partnership: CIA and the Origins of the BND, 1949–56, Volume I, edited by Kevin C. Ruffner and dated 2006 for the National Clandestine Service, is a different document from both 1945–49 volumes. Its released front matter lists Part I, CIA’s contemporary information on the Gehlen Organization — 1951 station briefings from Karlsruhe and a September 1953 “History of the Gehlen Intelligence Organization” — and Part II, Pullach Operations Base and U.S.–German cooperation, including 1949 cables and memoranda carried under the cryptonyms ODEUM, OFFSPRING, and ZIPPER.
Among the annexed documents in the Archive’s posting, Document 1 is Gerhard Wessel’s undated “Statement of Gerhard Wessel on Development of the German Organization.” Volume I’s table of contents lists that statement as the first item under “Firsthand Accounts.” The statement is its own PDF; the Volume I introduction does not print it. Wessel dates Gehlen’s appointment as chief of Fremde Heere Ost to May 1942, when Gehlen was a lieutenant colonel, and the statement includes an entry for 20 July 1944.
Gehlen appears as Fremde Heere Ost chief, Army-sponsored organizer, CIA patron’s counterpart, and first BND head — the offices these records name. The Archives release states that, in building the organization, Gehlen recruited some former members of the SS. Heinz Felfe appears as a named associate later exposed as a Soviet mole. The 2002 release and the CIA history do not state a war-crime conviction for Gehlen. Service in the BND after him is not, in these records, described as Nazi membership passed down by the office.
The Army-to-CIA handoff and the later BND transition are the sequence these records give. Public Cold War alliance rhetoric did not, at the time, disclose that eastern-front files and personnel from Fremde Heere Ost were the seed of a U.S.-backed German service. That gap is what the 2002 release and the CIA volumes close for the historical record.
What the Paper Trail Settles
The record is U.S. Army and then CIA use of Gehlen’s eastern-front organization; CIA’s assumption of responsibility in mid-1949 after debate; the transition into the BND under Gehlen; and SS recruitment and penetration risks in the declassified history and the 2002 Archives release. The bargain was not a public alliance at the time.
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