Central banks, Federal Reserve, and economic manipulation
Toshiba’s 2015 Independent Investigation Committee report, September restatements of multi-year securities filings, and a December SESC recommendation culminating in an FSA administrative monetary penalty of about ¥7.37 billion form the documentary spine. Contested/L2 keeps living executives inside court/regulator verbs only and refuses lifestyle color.
SEC and SDNY actions against Drexel Burnham Lambert and Michael Milken produced a six-count corporate plea ($650 million) and Milken’s April 1990 six-count guilty plea with parallel SEC disgorgement/bar settlements. Contested/L2 keeps living-person court verbs only and refuses pardon/politics as erasure of the plea spine.
The July 2016 forfeiture complaint calls 1MDB a Malaysian development company and then alleges Good Star, Aabar-BVI, and Tanore paths for bond proceeds. Goldman’s parent took a deferred prosecution; the Malaysian subsidiary pleaded guilty. The US civil and criminal record is the documented core. Malaysian political narrative stays outside L1. Contested/L2 HOLD. Verdict not flipped.
Olympus deferred 1990s-era investment losses via tobashi receiver funds and later acquisition/advisory accounting, admitted through a 2011 Third Party Committee and corrected filings; SESC recommended penalties for false statements. Documented / L2; court/role verbs; no yakuza L1 baptism without a court door.
In November 2014 the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists published Luxembourg Leaks—hundreds of PricewaterhouseCoopers tax rulings and related documents showing how multinationals secured advance comfort from Luxembourg’s tax administration. The journalism landed as a European political shock.
Structured RMBS and CDOs needed NRSRO investment-grade stamps to clear institutional rules. SEC July 2008 staff exams, the FCIC Final Report, and Senate PSI Anatomy findings document issuer-pays conflicts, documentation gaps, and cliff downgrades—rating agencies as essential cogs, not a single wrong spreadsheet.
Wells Fargo opened accounts and products customers did not request under sales pressure so the cross-sell metric held. CFPB and OCC 2016 orders imposed $100 million and $35 million federal penalties; the 2020 DOJ Statement of Facts and SEC cease-and-desist document millions of unauthorized accounts and a $500 million SEC civil penalty with a company DPA. No personal CEO criminal conviction invented. Documented/L2.
After Russia's August 1998 shock, FRBNY facilitated a private creditor consortium that recapitalized Long-Term Capital Management. McDonough and Greenspan testimony plus the April 1999 PWG report document systemic-risk justification, no public funds, and leverage/disclosure lessons—too-big-to-fail private rescue politics under official auspices.
In 2012 JPMorgan Chase’s Chief Investment Office Synthetic Credit Portfolio produced multi-billion-dollar losses (the “London Whale”). The Senate PSI March 2013 case history and January/September 2013 OCC and Federal Reserve consent orders and civil money penalties document risk-governance and supervisory failure.
LIBOR was published as an average of what banks said they would pay to borrow. Barclays admitted its submitters moved quotes for derivatives traders and so the bank would not look weak, and it paid $160 million under a non-prosecution agreement plus a $200 million CFTC order and a £59.5 million FSA fine. Those are settlements. They are not a conviction of the bank and not convictions of unnamed individuals.
The SFO discontinued its BAE Al-Yamamah investigation on 14 December 2006 citing national/international security. The House of Lords upheld the Director's discretion in Corner House [2008] UKHL 60; OECD Phase 2bis treated the halt as an Article 5 / prosecutorial-independence crisis. Documented halt, judicial review, and peer-review criticism—not a settled verdict on every payment allegation.
Wirecard’s 22 June 2020 ad-hoc said 1.9 billion euros in trustee balances most probably did not exist; insolvency 25 June. BaFin short-sale ban, BMF chronology, Bundestag inquiry, BGH civil press note. No invented final criminal sentence. Documented/L2.
Between 2011 and 2015, Deutsche Bank Moscow–London mirror equity trades cleared dollars through New York. The NYDFS 30 January 2017 Consent Order ($425M) and UK FCA Final Notice (£163M) document AML-control failures around ~$10B-scale flows; a parallel DOJ criminal strand remained unfinished—hence documented/L2.
Barings PLC collapsed in February 1995 after unauthorized Singapore futures and options losses concealed in error account 88888. The Board of Banking Supervision HC 673 report, Bank of England Court minutes, and RBA supervisor summary document multi-year detection failure and comprehensive internal-control breakdown—individual misconduct enabled by missing segregation of duties.
Customer statements and confirmations showed securities transactions the information says were not executed. On 10 December 2008 Madoff described a Ponzi scheme; the complaint records his estimate as approximately $50 billion and the press release as at least $50 billion, while the information puts approximately $64.8 billion on the November 2008 statements. OIG-509 found three exams and two investigations never verified trading with an independent third party. A later DTC check put about $2.5 billion on one feeder statement against less than $18 million at the depository. Documented/L2. Missed-warning file, not a lifestyle file.
UN Oil-for-Food moved tens of billions under sanctions relief. Resolution 1538 mandated the Volcker Independent Inquiry Committee, whose September 2005 management report and October 2005 manipulation report documented UN oversight failure and Iraqi oil surcharges/humanitarian kickbacks—official inquiry spine, not table-as-conviction folklore.
In January 2017 Rolls-Royce resolved multi-jurisdictional bribery investigations with a UK Serious Fraud Office deferred prosecution agreement approved by Sir Brian Leveson P, a coordinated U.S. Department of Justice Foreign Corrupt Practices Act DPA, and a Brazilian settlement. Combined penalties ran to roughly £497 million on the SFO side and about $170 million for the DOJ criminal penalty,…
The Panama Papers were a 2016 ICIJ-led leak of Mossack Fonseca's offshore files; the reporting documented elite tax structures, sanctions evasion cases, and political fallout worldwide.
Insolvent savings and loans were kept open while regulatory accounting, income-capital certificates, and in some cases land flips hid how bad the assets were, because the insurance fund could not afford to close them. FIRREA and the Resolution Trust Corporation later resolved 747 thrifts and presented a public bill. Fraud at particular institutions is part of that record. It is not a single plot for the whole industry.
Bankruptcy examiner Anton R. Valukas's March 2010 report reconstructs Lehman's Repo 105/108 trades that temporarily removed assets to shrink reported net leverage at quarter-end. Volumes 1, 3, and 4 document the sale-treatment device, leverage targeting, and colorable-claims analysis—accounting disguise of risk, not a claim that Repo 105 alone caused 2008.
On 18 February 2009 UBS AG entered a DOJ Tax deferred prosecution agreement in S.D. Florida resolving a § 371 conspiracy information for facilitating undeclared U.S. Swiss accounts, agreeing to pay $780 million and exit the cross-border business. DPA PDF, DOJ announcement, CourtListener docket, DiCicco PSI testimony, and IRS IR-2009-75 document the spine. Contested HOLD: settlement ≠ exoneration.
On 15 August 1971 Nixon's New Economic Policy suspended dollar–gold convertibility, added an import surcharge, and froze wages and prices. FRUS Volume III, the State Historian milestone, and the Nixon Library almanac document Camp David's deliberate package and the Smithsonian-to-1973 float sequel—managed end of Bretton Woods, not accidental gold panic.