In 1950 germs were sprayed over San Francisco in secret; in 1977 the Army called a hospital outbreak coincidental. The record is a 1977 Senate subcommittee hearing that reprints the Army's own report, a National Security Archive briefing book on that report and on the 1969 end of offensive germ weapons, President Nixon's announcement of that end, a 1983 Ninth Circuit opinion in the Nevin family's suit, a 2004 journal review, and a 2025 KQED account. What was hidden was the test itself, from the people who breathed it: KQED reports the bacteria were sprayed from a Navy ship offshore, the test was not disclosed to the city, and the hearing says the public learned of it from 1976 news reports and the Army's 1977 report. The reason the court record names is secrecy for national security.
What the Army disclosed in 1977
Senator Edward M. Kennedy opened the March 1977 hearing of the Senate Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research by saying the subcommittee had learned "for the first time" the extent of Defense Department activity in biological warfare, and he asked whether a democratic people should let government decide alone "when secret tests on unwitting subjects" are necessary. He said the interests of national security "might have been better served by more public understanding and less concealment." Lieutenant Colonel George A. Carruth testified that simulant tests were meant to learn how vulnerable the United States was to attack, that 19 were conducted in the public domain, and that one test was meant to learn whether an enemy could attack at sea and infect the population. He said the San Francisco test was done in 1950, when both Serratia marcescens and Bacillus globigii were thought to be nonpathogenic.
Senator Richard Schweiker raised a 1951 article in the AMA Archives of Internal Medicine by Dr. Wheat and others reporting 11 hospital cases of the same organism around the time of the test, with one death. General William Augerson said a civilian panel met at Fort Detrick in 1952 to consider that article, and agreed that the safety officer then barred tests near hospitals. Schweiker noted that the Army kept using the organism through 1968. Asked about bacteria detected 50 miles inland, Carruth said "our records do not indicate that was an Army test," and Schweiker said he believed it was a Navy test.
The Army report reprinted in the hearing lists a San Francisco test in September 1950 using Serratia marcescens and Bacillus globigii, and says the test used those simulants with fluorescent particles. Its annex on news stories says the reports were "essentially correct" except in linking disease to the 1950 test; it says the association "appears to be coincidental" because no other hospitals reported similar findings and all the patients had urinary tract infections, and that suspicion about the one death "has been refuted repeatedly." It records that the 1952 panel advised continued use of the organism even over populated areas and hospital follow-up studies to learn whether the cases were coincidental. At the May session, J. M. Joseph of the Maryland health department testified that the test "should never have been conducted on the unsuspecting" public.
Biological Testing Involving Human Subjects by the Department of Defense, 1977, Senate hearings of March 8 and May 23, 1977: https://archive.org/details/Biotestinghumansubjectsenate1977
The Army history and the end of the program
The National Security Archive's briefing book on U.S. biological warfare posts the Army's official history, U.S. Army Activity in the U.S. Biological Warfare Programs, dated 24 February 1977 and reprinted in the 1977 hearings, and says its supporting volume covers biological field testing and safety concerns about open-air tests. The briefing book says Nixon approved the end of all U.S. offensive biological and chemical weapons programs in NSDM 35 of 25 November 1969, while providing for continued defensive research.
National Security Archive, Electronic Briefing Book No. 58, Biowar: https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB58/
In his remarks that day, Nixon said germ warfare "has massive, unpredictable, and potentially uncontrollable consequences," that the United States would renounce the use of deadly biological weapons, and that its programs would be confined to research in biological defense.
Richard Nixon, Remarks on Chemical and Biological Defense Policies and Programs, 25 November 1969: https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-announcing-decisions-chemical-and-biological-defense-policies-and-programs
The court record
Relatives of Edward Nevin sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act, claiming he died as a result of government negligence in a simulated biological warfare attack on San Francisco in 1950. The Ninth Circuit, in an opinion decided 17 January 1983, held that General Anthony McAuliffe, the Chief Chemical Officer, chose San Francisco and approved Serratia marcescens at the planning level, weighing factors that included national security and "a need for secrecy," so the claim fell within the discretionary function exemption; it vacated the judgment and remanded for dismissal. Judge Norris, dissenting, would have found jurisdiction but affirmed because the district court's finding "that the bacteria used by the Army did not cause Nevin's death was not clearly erroneous."
Nevin v. United States, 696 F.2d 1229 (9th Cir. 1983), OpenJurist: https://openjurist.org/696/f2d/1229/nevin-v-united-states
A journal review
A 2004 historical review by Stefan Riedel in Proceedings (Baylor University Medical Center) says cities on both coasts were surreptitiously used as laboratories when simulants were released in covert experiments in New York City, San Francisco, and other sites, placing those studies between 1951 and 1954. It says concerns about public health hazards were raised after outbreaks of urinary tract infections caused by Serratia marcescens at Stanford University Hospital between September 1950 and February 1951, and that the outbreak followed covert experiments using the organism in San Francisco.
Stefan Riedel, Biological warfare and bioterrorism: a historical review (2004), PMC: https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC1200679/
A later account
KQED reported that for eight days in September 1950 the military sprayed bacteria over the Bay Area from a Navy ship offshore, and that monitors at 43 sampling stations found it traveled as far as 23 miles. It quotes an Army summary line that every one of the 800,000 people in San Francisco "inhaled 5,000 or more fluorescent particles." It reports that the Nevin family lost at trial, lost again at the Ninth Circuit, and that the Supreme Court declined to hear the case.
KQED, The True Story of the Military's Secret 1950 San Francisco Biological Weapons Test: https://www.kqed.org/news/12062909/the-true-story-of-the-militarys-secret-1950-san-francisco-biological-weapons-test
The record on the cover-up
When the test came out, the Army called the Stanford cases coincidental, a court found the government immune, and the dissent left in place a finding that the bacteria did not cause Nevin's death. The reason the court gives is that secrecy was among the national security factors weighed.