UKUSA states long refused to acknowledge their pact; in 2001 Europe's Parliament called their system no longer in doubt. The path to that finding runs through two studies for the Parliament's research office, a set of declassified American papers, the temporary committee's report, and the resolution adopted on 5 September 2001. A 2015 article then quotes agency papers that use the name. The denial, as these records print it, was silence about the system and about the agreement behind it. The reason the committee report gives is that secret services do not disclose their work.
A 1998 study names the system
"An Appraisal of Technologies of Political Control," a working document for the Parliament's Scientific and Technological Options Assessment office, dated Luxembourg, 6 January 1998, PE 166 499, cites Nicky Hager's Secret Power (1996), which it says interviewed more than 50 people concerned with intelligence, as the most comprehensive account of a project known as ECHELON. It lists sites at Sugar Grove and Yakima in the United States, Waihopai in New Zealand, Geraldton in Australia, Hong Kong, and Morwenstow in the United Kingdom. It says ECHELON is designed for primarily non-military targets, governments, organisations and businesses, and that five nations share the results under the UKUSA agreement of 1948, with the United States as senior partner.
STOA working document, 6 January 1998: https://cryptome.org/stoa-atpc.htm
The 1999 follow-up report
Interception Capabilities 2000, written by Duncan Campbell in April 1999 as a report to the Parliament's Director General for Research, says the UKUSA agreement was not acknowledged publicly until March 1999, when the Australian government confirmed that its Defence Signals Directorate "does co-operate with counterpart signals intelligence organisations overseas under the UKUSA relationship." It says United States government documents confirm that the Sugar Grove station in West Virginia is an ECHELON site, and it notes in another passage that NSA will not confirm or deny allegations about access to Internet traffic.
Interception Capabilities 2000: https://irp.fas.org/eprint/ic2000/ic2000.htm
Declassified papers that carry the name
National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 24, published 13 January 2000 and edited by Jeffrey T. Richelson, reproduces a Naval Security Group instruction of 3 September 1991 for Sugar Grove. The editor writes that the instruction associates Sugar Grove with a program codenamed ECHELON, described in public as a global surveillance network, and that in reality ECHELON is a more limited program letting the UKUSA allies specify requirements and receive intercepts from facilities that intercept satellite communications. A 1994 Air Intelligence Agency history extract, "Activation of Echelon Units," places ECHELON units at detachments in Sabana Seca, Puerto Rico, and Sugar Grove.
NSA Electronic Briefing Book No. 24: https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB23/
What the committee found, and how the silence worked
Report A5-0264/2001, filed on 11 July 2001 by the Temporary Committee on the ECHELON Interception System with Gerhard Schmid as rapporteur, records a mandate "to verify the existence" of the system described in the STOA study, and a committee vote of 27 to 5 with 2 abstentions. It gives the reason for working from clues: it is only natural that secret services do not disclose details of their work, so there is, at least officially, no statement by the UKUSA services that they work together to operate a global interception system. It says the signatory states for a long time refused officially to acknowledge the UKUSA Agreement, then cites a 1999-2000 UK Intelligence and Security Committee report, a 2000 New Zealand publication, and a 16 March 1999 letter from Martin Brady, head of the Australian service, as references to it. The report says the Council Presidency answered members' questions by saying it had no relevant information and could give no replies, and that Commissioner Bangemann said in September 1998 the Commission had no evidence the system existed in the form suggested. It says a meeting with the Commerce Department's Advocacy Center in Washington was cancelled, and the rapporteur writes that he can only assume this was because the Center is involved in activities the administration wishes to keep secret.
Committee report A5-0264/2001: https://www.ccdcoe.org/uploads/2018/10/EU-010711-ECHELON_Report.pdf
The plenary resolution
The resolution adopted on 5 September 2001, printed in the Official Journal C 72 E of 21 March 2002, states that a global interception system run under the UKUSA Agreement by the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand is no longer in doubt, and that its name is likely in fact ECHELON, "a relatively minor detail." It says the system's purpose is to intercept private and commercial communications, though its capabilities are probably not nearly as extensive as some media had assumed. It calls it surprising, not to say worrying, that senior Community figures, including Commissioners, claimed to be unaware. It records that the United States and the United Kingdom state they do not use interception for competitive intelligence.
Resolution, Official Journal C 72 E: https://www.ccdcoe.org/uploads/2018/10/EU-010905-EP_Resolution_ECHELON.pdf
Later papers, as a 2015 article prints them
In The Intercept of 3 August 2015, Duncan Campbell writes that documents from Edward Snowden included details of the "ECHELON agreement." He quotes a January 2011 newsletter of NSA's Yakima Research Station: in 1966 NSA set up FROSTING for satellite communications, and ECHELON was its sub-program for INTELSAT communications. He quotes a 2005 SID Today article saying "yes, there is an ECHELON system," and a 2010 GCHQ report naming the "Echelon Agreement." He quotes the SID Today writer's account of the European delegation's Washington visit, that its appointments were cancelled and "our interests, and our SIGINT partners' interests, were protected." GCHQ's answer, as he prints it: "It is long standing policy that we do not comment on intelligence matters."
The Intercept, 3 August 2015: https://theintercept.com/2015/08/03/life-unmasking-british-eavesdroppers/
The record on the name
What was withheld, as these doors print it, was official acknowledgment of the UKUSA agreement and of a joint interception system. The form was refusal to acknowledge, no replies from the Council, a Commission statement of no evidence, a cancelled meeting, and a standing policy of no comment. Australia's 1999 confirmation of the agreement, the 2001 committee report, and the resolution came first; the 2015 article then quotes agency papers that use the name.
