Why there was a review
For more than twenty years, U.S. intelligence agencies funded research into remote viewing, the claimed ability to describe distant places or objects with the mind. By the mid 1990s the program was known as Star Gate. Its history, as the American Institutes for Research (AIR) summarized it in 1995: "CIA's program began in 1972, but was discontinued in 1977. DIA's direct involvement began about 1985." From 1986 to early fiscal year 1995, the program "received more than 200 tasks from operational military organizations."
Then the program changed hands. "At the request of Congress, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is considering assuming responsibility for this the remote viewing program," AIR wrote, and the CIA asked AIR whether the research had "long-term practical value." The CIA "transferred to AIR all reports and documents relevant to the review." A draft of the report survives in the CIA's own declassified records.
The panel
AIR assembled what it called a "blue ribbon" panel. It included two outside experts, "selected to represent both sides of the paranormal controversy": Jessica Utts, professor of statistics at the University of California, Davis, and Ray Hyman, professor of psychology at the University of Oregon. Two AIR senior scientists with no background in parapsychology joined them. Lincoln Moses of Stanford advised on statistics, and David Goslin coordinated. Edwin May, the program's principal investigator, supplied the studies he considered strongest.
The case for
Utts was direct: "Using the standards applied to any other area of science, it is concluded that psychic functioning has been well established. The statistical results of the studies examined are far beyond what is expected by chance."
The caution
Hyman agreed that recent effect sizes "probably cannot be dismissed as due to chance." But he went on: "Obviously I do not agree that all possibilities for alternative explanations of the non-chance results have been eliminated." No experiment, he added, can be shown to be "completely free from possible flaws."
The verdict and the decision
AIR's final report, dated September 29, 1995, split the question in two. In the laboratory, "A statistically significant laboratory effort has been demonstrated in the sense that hits occur more often than chance." But "it is unclear whether the observed effects can unambiguously be attributed to the paranormal ability of the remote viewers."
On 40 operational tasks, AIR found that "the utility of RV for operational intelligence collection cannot be substantiated." The information was "vague and ambiguous," and so "continued use of remote viewing in intelligence gathering operations is not warranted."
Looking back in 2021, the CIA described AIR's conclusion as finding remote viewing "too unreliable, inconsistent, and sporadic to be useful for intelligence purposes." It wrote: "We decided not to restore the program." At Congress's request, it later reviewed and declassified the records.
The adherents' answer
Edwin May answered in the Journal of Scientific Exploration in 1996. He notes that responsibility moved to the CIA "as part of the fiscal year 1995 defense appropriations bill," and that the report was released on "28 November 1995." He argues that "there is compelling evidence that the CIA set the outcome with regard to intelligence usage before the evaluation had begun." In his account, the review restricted the data it examined and did not interview key participants, and so reached "the wrong conclusion." Was it a fair test?