The theft looked like a Soviet success. What was not said was that Line X was being fed altered technical data. Colonel Vladimir I. Vetrov, called Farewell, supplied about 4,000 KGB documents. In the summer of 1981 President François Mitterrand told President Reagan, and the material went through Vice President Bush to the CIA. Gus W. Weiss, writing later in the CIA’s Studies in Intelligence, said that since 1970 Line X had taken thousands of documents and sample products, enough that Soviet research appeared to be running in large measure on Western, particularly American, work. He named losses in radar, computers, machine tools, and semiconductors, and said Line X had filled two-thirds to three-fourths of its requirements. In January 1982 he proposed to Director of Central Intelligence William Casey that the United States match the still-open requirements and feed back the products sought, made to look genuine and later fail. Contrived chips, he wrote, went into Soviet military equipment, and defective plans disrupted chemical plants and a tractor factory. Misleading information went out on stealth, space defense, and tactical aircraft. Casey liked the proposal. Reagan was enthusiastic. The FBI took the domestic side and the CIA the overseas side. Weiss wrote that it was never detected.
The Source and the List
The effort to obtain Western technical knowledge was suspected and not documented until 1981, when French intelligence obtained Vetrov. Once the material was supplied, Mitterrand’s disclosure “led to a potent counterintelligence response by CIA and the NATO intelligence services.” The French called the file the Farewell Dossier. Vetrov supplied Directorate T reports on goals and unfilled objectives, the names of more than 200 Line X officers in 10 KGB residencies in the West, and more than 100 recruitment leads. In 1970 the Council of Ministers and the Central Committee set up Directorate T of the KGB’s First Chief Directorate. The State Committee on Science and Technology and the Military-Industrial Commission were to feed Line X its requirements.
CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence — Gus W. Weiss, “The Farewell Dossier”: https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/static/The-Farewell-Dossier.pdf
What the Requirements List Was
A 1984 CIA estimate, NIE 11-1/7-84, declassified on 1 November 2021 under ISCAP appeal 2011-030, document 5, describes the system and does not, in this part, name Farewell. The program was supervised by the top political leadership. The VPK coordinated weapons development and supervised acquisition of military and dual-use Western technology. All acquisition of Western equipment and scientific information in support of VPK requirements was an intelligence operation, whoever collected it. The Ministry of Foreign Trade and the Academy of Sciences collected alongside the KGB and the GRU. Requirements named the items, priorities, how long each stayed valid, the levying ministry, the likely sources, and the budget. They covered hardware, production technology, and technical data, and were probably revised each year. The VPK scored results in ruble and time savings. This part does not say the list was used to ship altered goods. That step is Weiss’s account of 1982.
National Archives, ISCAP — 1984 CIA estimate, document 5, the requirements list: https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2011-030-doc-5-part-1.pdf
A Draft Study, Not the Playback
The Reagan Library file “Technology Transfer Meetings (Weiss/Manfredi)” holds a draft National Security Study Directive titled “US Technology Transfer Policy.” The number line is blank. It says the Administration does not now have a comprehensive written policy on West-East technology transfer, including protection from illegal acquisition by the Soviet Bloc, and that the most recent such effort was PRM-31, completed in 1978. The draft calls for an interagency study to produce a decision directive. A log in the same file records a Baldrige-to-Clark item received on 26 January 1983.
Ronald Reagan Presidential Library — deGraffenreid file, Technology Transfer Meetings (Weiss/Manfredi): https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/public/2023-10/40-139-39149351-R28-011-2023.pdf
The Decision to Feed the Channel
Weiss dates the proposal to January 1982. If the KGB learned of the interference, he thought Moscow might reject the whole take. Casey sent the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence to European services. Those meetings, Weiss wrote, led to the expulsion or compromise of about 200 Soviet officers and sources. About then, Vetrov fell into a tragic episode in a Moscow park, his espionage was discovered, and he was executed in 1983.
Controls That Do Not Order the Trap
On 17 January 1983 Reagan approved National Security Decision Directive 75. It is a control policy, not a shipping plan. Military advances were to be exploited, “while controls over transfer of military related dual-use technology, products, and services must be tightened.” Tasks included controls beyond the COCOM list, “including equipment in the oil and gas sector.” Weiss wrote that Farewell’s reports pushed the drafters toward that emphasis. The directive does not name Farewell, Line X, or altered products.
Ronald Reagan Presidential Library — NSDD 75, 17 January 1983: https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/archives/reference/scanned-nsdds/nsdd75.pdf
On 21 September 1985, National Security Decision Directive 189 set policy for information from federally funded fundamental research. It says Eastern Bloc acquisition of advanced U.S. technology, to enhance military capabilities, poses a significant threat, and that a small but significant target is research at universities and federal laboratories. A 1982 National Academy of Sciences study, sponsored by the Defense Department and the National Science Foundation and chaired by Dr. Dale Corson, concluded that significant transfer to the Soviet Union had come through many routes, with open communication of fundamental research a minor contributor. Where control is required, the mechanism is classification. The directive does not name Farewell.
Ronald Reagan Presidential Library — NSDD 189, 21 September 1985: https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/public/archives/reference/scanned-nsdds/nsdd189.pdf
On 20 November 1988, National Security Decision Directive 320 said efforts to stem strategic technologies to the Soviet Union and its allies had been vigorous, and that Western understanding of the Soviet technology acquisition program had increased. It records higher export-control enforcement, raised penalties, increased interdiction, faster licensing, a rejuvenated COCOM, and ties with key non-COCOM countries. Despite Gorbachev’s reforms, it says the threat remains, and policy remains to restrict transfers that would make a significant contribution to Soviet Bloc military capabilities.
Ronald Reagan Presidential Library — NSDD 320, 20 November 1988: https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/public/archives/reference/scanned-nsdds/nsdd320.pdf
What the Record Settles
Documented: Vetrov and about 4,000 KGB documents, passed to the United States in 1981; a VPK requirements list in one part of a 1984 CIA estimate; Weiss’s account that altered technical data was fed into that channel; and NSDD 75, NSDD 189, and NSDD 320, which restate technology-transfer controls and do not order the playback. The Archive files those doors as documented / L1.
